Research

My research focuses on the use of democratic institutions by non-democratic rulers to affect cooperation or competition among opposition factions. In particular I examine the effects of legislatures and political parties. I draw on substantive examples from across African and the Middle East with a special focus on Morocco. Papers are available upon request.

Dissertation Work

The Same Coin: How Democratic Institutions Simultaneously Cause and Solve Collective Action Problems
Abstract: Theories on the effect of democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes fall into two camps: (1) democratic institutions solve collective action problems faced by the regime and its allies; or (2) democratic institutions create collective action problems among the regime's opponents. I argue that both claims may be simultaneously true, and that the false dichotomy comes from an erroneous assumption that the political elite participating in the democratic institutions are monolithic. In this paper I present a theory of how democratic institutions can both solve the collective action problem among the regime's allies while creating collective action problems among the regime's opponents. I provide empirical support for this theory with an original data set of questions asked during the Moroccan parliament since 2011. I provide the first analysis of inter-delegate behavior in authoritarian regimes and show pro- or anti-regime party membership significantly affects delegate behavior. I find pro-regime parties act much more cohesively than anti-regime parties, in line with my theory that authoritarian democratic institutions both encourage cooperation among allies and encourage competition among opponents.

B*tches Get Sh*t Done: Women Parliamentarians in Authoritarian Regimes
Abstract: Scholarship on gendered behavior in legislative settings remains largely understudied, especially so in authoritarian regimes. Using original data from the Moroccan parliament, I show that female members of parliament in highly patriarchal societies participate at a higher rate than their male counterparts, regardless of party of political leanings, even when when female legislators only constitute a minority of politicians. The results suggest that female legislators must and do work harder than male legislators to accomplish their policy goals. These results are inline with the work done in American politics suggesting Congresswomen are more effective than Congressmen, but surprising in a context where female politicians are often family of party leaders, only nominated strategically, not directly competing with men, and society expects women to stay home.

Non-Consecutive Executives: Changing Preferences in a Changing World
Abstract: Why would voters re-elect a politician they previously removed from office? That is, if the voters would rather see an untested politician replace the current incumbent, why would they ever bring that former incumbent back instead of choosing another untested politician? Although rare, we do politicians returning to office after their removal and current formal models of elections are unable to deal with this phenomenon. The paper offers setup which both allows politicians to be potentially re-elected after having been removed from office and accounts for the relative rarity of its occurrence. Additionally, I find conditions under which a politician may run for office and loose, only to run again once more and win.

Working Papers and Works in Progress

A Little Birdie Told Me: Modeling Experimental Learning with Martingales
Abstract: In this paper I develop a model of how a legislator learns the multi-dimensional policy preferences of her colleagues in circumstances of extreme uncertainty. Using the property of martingale convergence, I identify the conditions under which improvements can be made to the status quo while remaining ambivalent regarding whether the legislative colleagues are acting sincerely or strategically.