Research

My research focuses on the use of democratic institutions by non-democratic rulers to affect cooperation or competition among opposition factions. In particular I examine the effects of legislatures and political parties. I draw on substantive examples from across African and the Middle East with a special focus on Morocco. Papers are available upon request.

Dissertation Work

The Same Coin: How Democratic Institutions Simultaneously Cause and Solve Collective Action Problems
Abstract: Theories on the effect of democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes fall into two camps: (1) democratic institutions solve collective action problems faced by the regime and its allies; or (2) democratic institutions create collective action problems among the regime's opponents. I argue that both claims may be simultaneously true, and that the false dichotomy comes from an erroneous assumption that the political elite participating in the democratic institutions are monolithic. In this paper I present a theory of how democratic institutions can both solve the collective action problem among the regime's allies while creating collective action problems among the regime's opponents. I provide empirical support for this theory with an original data set of questions asked during the Moroccan parliament since 2011. I provide the first analysis of inter-delegate behavior in authoritarian regimes and show pro- or anti-regime party membership significantly affects delegate behavior. I find pro-regime parties act much more cohesively than anti-regime parties, in line with my theory that authoritarian democratic institutions both encourage cooperation among allies and encourage competition among opponents.

How Women Become Politicians
Abstract: How do female politicians convince their male colleagues to take them seriously? Much of the previous work on women in politics focuses on the relationship between female politicians and voters, not female politicians and their influential colleagues. However, political elites play an important role in determining how many and which female politicians are elected. I argue in order to prove women belong in the legislature, female politicians demonstrate competency by questioning policy. As women are motivated by the desire to demonstrate competency, given the option between privately addressing a government minister or speaking in front of their peers, women choose the latter. I support my argument by analyzing the rate of questioning policy of male and female members of the Moroccan parliament. The data comes from an original data set, collected from the question records of Morocco's lower house of parliament from 2011-2018. I find that women do question policy at a greater rate than men and prioritize public speaking over written questions. Although the gap in questioning rates decreases overtime, this is due to men asking significantly more questions, not women asking fewer. This paper offers the first politician-level analysis of gendered behavior in authoritarian regimes.

Non-Consecutive Executives: Changing Preferences in a Changing World
Abstract: Why would voters re-elect a politician they previously removed from office? That is, if the voters would rather see an untested politician replace the current incumbent, why would they ever bring that former incumbent back instead of choosing another untested politician? Although rare, we do politicians returning to office after their removal and current formal models of elections are unable to deal with this phenomenon. The paper offers setup which both allows politicians to be potentially re-elected after having been removed from office and accounts for the relative rarity of its occurrence. Additionally, I find conditions under which a politician may run for office and loose, only to run again once more and win.

Working Papers and Works in Progress

A Little Birdie Told Me: Modeling Experimental Learning with Martingales
Abstract: In this paper I develop a model of how a legislator learns the multi-dimensional policy preferences of her colleagues in circumstances of extreme uncertainty. Using the property of martingale convergence, I identify the conditions under which improvements can be made to the status quo while remaining ambivalent regarding whether the legislative colleagues are acting sincerely or strategically.